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A pestilent pernicious people . . . such as take the oaths to the Government, 
but underhand . . . labor its subversion. 
Bishop Trelawny, 1717 
The Hidden Realm of Political Conflict 
Descriptions and analyses of open political action dominate accounts of 
political conflict. This is the case whether those accounts are presented by 
historians, political scientists, journalists, statesmen, or leaders of popular 
movements. Some of the most telling analyses of conflict are in fact 
designed precisely to explain under what circumstances groups in conflict 
resort to one or another kind of open political action. Thus, why some 
groups under certain conditions are likely to employ violent forms of polit- 
ical action -e.g. riots, rebellion, revolutionary movements - rather than 
less violent forms - e.g. petitions, rallies, peaceful marches, protest voting, 
strikes, boycotts -has occupied center stage. As aresult of careful historical 
comparisons social scientists have begun to grasp how certain social struc- 
tures, state systems, cultural values, and historical practices help shape 
political action. 
The undeniable advances made along these lines, however, are fatalIy 
compromised by a damagingly narrow and poverty-stricken view of politi- 
cal action. There is a vast realm of political action, described below, that is 
almost habitually overlooked. It is ignored for at least two reasons. First, it 
is not openly declared in the usually understood sense of "politics." Se- 
cond, neither is it group action in the usually understood sense of collec- 
tive action. The argument to be developed here is that much of the politics 
of subordinate groups falls into the category of "everyday forms of 
resistance," that these activities should most definitely be considered po- 
litical, that they do constitute a form of collective action, and that any ac- 
count which ignores them is often ignoring the most vital means by which 
lower classes manifest their political interests. The balance of this essay is 
devoted to sustaining and elaborating this claim. 
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The Brechtian or Schweikian forms of resistance I have in mind are an in- 
tegral part of the small arsenal of relatively powerless groups. They in- 
clude such acts as foot-dragging, dissimulations, false compliance, 
feigned ignorance, desertion, pilfering, smuggling, poaching, arson, 
slander, sabotage, surreptitious assault and murder, anonymous threats, 
and so on. These techniques, for the most part quite prosaic, are the ordi- 
nary means of class struggle. They are the techniques of "first resort" in 
those common historical circumstances in which open defiance is impos- 
sible or entails mortal danger. When they are widely practiced by members 
of an entire class against elites or the state, they may have aggregate conse- 
quences all out of proportion to their banality when considered singly. No 
adequate account of class relations is possible without assessing their im- 
portance. That they have been absent or marginal to most accounts of class 
relations is all too understandable. The purpose, after all, of many such 
techniques is to avoid notice and detection. Resistance of this kind is ironi- 
cally abetted by both elites and social scientists whose attention is largely 
concentrated on those forms of resistance which pose a declared threat to 
powerholders: social movements, dissident sects, revolutionary groups, 
and other forms of publicly organized political opposition. Such groups, 
of course, are also far more likely to leave the written records - manifestos, 
minutes, membership lists, jounalists' descriptions, and police reports - 
that help ensure them a firm place in the historical record. 
Here it may be useful to distinguish eve y d a y  forms of class resistance 
from the more typical forms of political conflict which dominate the 
historiography of the peasantry and other subordinate groups. The easiest 
way to highlight the distinction is to contrast paired forms of resistance. 
The first in each pair is "everyday" resistance in my definition of the term 
while the second is a more direct, open confrontation having the same ob- 
jective. Thus in one sphere lies the quiet, piecemeal process by which 
peasant squatters or poachers have often encroached on plantation and 
state forest lands; in the other a public invasion of property that openly 
challenges property relations. Each action aims at a redistribution of con- 
trol over property; the former aims at tacit, de facto gains while the latter 
aims at formal, de jure-- recognition of those gains. In one sphere lies a 
process of cascading military desertion; in the other an open mutiny aim- 
ing at eliminating or replacing officers. In one sphere lies the pilfering of 
public and private grain stores; in the other an open attack on markets or 
granaries aiming at the redistribution of the food supply. The contrasts 
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illustrate that those who employ everyday forms of resistance avoid calling 
attention to themselves. Such techniques are relatively safe, they often 
promise vital material gains, and they require little or no formal coordina- 
tion let alone formal organization - although they typically rely on a vener- 
able popular culture of resistance to accomplish their ends. 
In each of these paired comparisons, the presumed objective is similar. 
Both squatters and land invaders hope to acquire the use of property; both 
deserters and mutineers may wish to end a costly battle or war. The rela- 
tive safety - and it is only a relative safety - of everyday forms of resistance 
has much to do with the small scale of the action. Squatters virtually seep 
onto the land in small groups, often at night to avoid calling attention to 
themselves; deserters are likely to slip away unnoticed when the opportu- 
nity arises. Each of these small events may be beneath notice and, from the 
perpetrator's point of view, they are often designed to be beneath notice. 
Collectively, however, these small events may add up almost surrepti- 
tiously to alarge event: an army too short of conscripts to fight, a workforce 
whose footdragging bankrupts the enterprise, a landholding gentry 
driven from the countryside to the towns by arson and assault, tracts of 
state land fully occupied by squatters, a tax claim of the state gradually 
transformed into a dead letter by evasion. 
It is not far-fetched to suggest that the difference between everyday 
forms of resistance and more open forms of political conflict may often boil 
down to tactical wisdom. Peasants who consider themselves entitled to 
land claimed by the state may choose to squat rather than to invade openly 
in force because they know that an invasion will probably be met with 
armed force and bloodshed. When, on the other hand, the political cli- 
mate makes a more open occupation of land comparatively safe, some- 
thing closer to a land invasion becomes plausible. Certainly, peasants and 
subordinate groups generally may find large- scale collective action inher- 
ently difficult owing to their geographical dispersion, ethnic and linguis- 
tic differences, a lack of organizational skills and experience, and so forth. 
It is no less likely, however, that their preferences in techniques of 
resistance may arise from the knowledge of surveillance, a realistic fear of 
coercion, and a past experience that encourages caution. If, as is some- 
times the case, the same results may be achieved by everyday resistance, 
albeit more slowly, at a vastly reduced risk, then it is surely the more ra- 
tional course. The invariably fatal results of slave uprisings in the ante-bel- 
lum U.S. South suggest that the long-term slave preference for flight, pil- 
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fering, foot-dragging and false compliance was largely a matter of tactical 
wisdom. 
A skeptic might grant the argument made thus far and nevertheless 
claim that everyday forms of resistance do not belong in an account of class 
struggle because they are individual, not class strategies, and because they 
benefit individuals not classes. The first claim is largely untenable. It can 
be shown that most forms of everyday resistance cannot be sustained 
without a fairly high level of tacit cooperation among the class of resisters. 
This will become more apparent in examples described later. The second 
claim is true, but the personal benefit arising from everyday forms of 
resistance - providing it does not come at the expense of other members of 
the class1 - can hardly disqualify them from consideration as a form of 
class conflict. Most forms of everyday resistance are, after all, deployed 
precisely to thwart some appropriation by superior classes and/or the 
state. If the resistance succeeds at all, it of course confers a material benefit 
on the resister. The disposition of scarce resources is surely what is at stake 
in any conflict between classes. When it is a question of a few poachers, ar- 
sonists, or deserters, their actions are of little moment for class conflict. 
When, however, such activities become sufficiently generalized to become 
a pattern of resistance, their relevance to class conflict is clear. 
Consider the following definition that focuses on the process of ap- 
propriation: 
Lower class resistance among peasants is any act(s) by member(s) 
of the class that is (are) intended either to mitigate or to deny 
claims ( e g  rents, taxes, deference) made on that class by superor- 
dinate classes (e.g. landlords, the state, owners of machinery, 
moneylenders) or to advance its own claims (e.g. to work, land, 
charity, respect) vis-8-vis these superordinate classes. 
Three aspects of the definition merit brief comment. First, there is no re- 
quirement that resistance takes the form of collective action. And yet some 
level of cooperation is generally evident in everyday forms of resistance 
since even the slave who pilfers or shirks depends on the complicitous si- 
lence of other slaves to escape detection. The same is, of course, true for the 
poacher who believes he and others like him have a right to the fish, game, 
and fuel of the nearby forest. Each depends for his success on a minimal 
level of group cohesion. Second - and this is a nettlesome issue - inten- 
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tions are built into the definition. This formulation allows for the fact that 
many intended acts of resistance may backfire and produce consequences 
that were entirely unanticipated. Finally, the definition recognizes what 
we might call symbolic or ideological resistance (for example, gossip, 
slander, the rejection of demeaning labels, the withdrawal of deference) as 
an integral part of class-based resistance. From a broader perspective this 
definition recognizes, as I believe any convincing definition must, the role 
that self-interested material needs must play in any realistic definition of 
peasant resistance. To do so affirms the fact that class conflict is, first and 
foremost, a struggle over the appropriation of work, property, production, 
and taxes. Consumption, from this perspective, is both the goal and the 
outcome of resistance and counter-resistance.' Petty thefts of grain or pil- 
fering on the treshing floor may seem like trivial "coping" mechanisms 
from one vantage point; but from a broader view of class relations, how the 
harvest is actually divided belongs at the center. 
Varieties of Practice, Unity of Purpose 
The various practices that might plausibly be claimed to represent every- 
day forms of resistance are legion. To an outside observer it might appear 
quixotic to assemble them under the same heading. Their variety is noth- 
ing more than a mirror image of the variety of forms of appropriation; for 
every form of appropriation there is likely to be one - or many - forms of 
everyday resistance devised to thwart that appropriation. What gives 
these techniques a certain unity is that they are invariably quiet, disguised, 
anonymous, often undeclared forms of resisting claims imposed by clai- 
mants who have superior access to force and to public power. A brief anal- 
ysis of four forms of everyday resistance will help illustrate this unity as 
well as delineate more sharply the circumstances that favor such 
resistance, the results it may achieve, the disguises it wears, the complicity 
it requires, and its limits. The examples are selected both for their 
representative diversity and for the complementary analytical light they 
shed on the phenomenon of everyday resistance. 
Poaching 
For roughly two centuries from 1650 to 1850, thc most popular crime in En- 
gland was almost certainly poaching. Although poaching is usually un- 
derstood to refer to the "theft" of someone else's property in wild game, 
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fish, and perhaps firewood, it comprises a vastly greater range of practices. 
Cottagers, laborers, and yeomen might encroach on gentry or crown 
property to take turf, peat, heath, rushes for thatching and lighting, brush- 
wood, clay, stone, chalk, coal, to graze their own livestock, pick medicinal 
herbs, or to till land. Both the objects and volume of poaching varied over 
time in keeping with the proximity of "poachable" resources, how hard- 
pressed the rural population was, the need for certain commodities, the 
risks of being apprehended, the likely punishment if apprehended, and 
the traditions animating the local c~mmunity.~ The issue came to be of 
such concern to large landowners and the crown that in the 18th century, 
draconian laws were passed specifying capital punishment for poachers. 
More precisely, it became a capital offense merely to be caught in disguise 
(hence the name, the "Black" Act) in the woods, the assumption being that 
anyone so attired was a poacher. 
For our purposes, the most important fact about poaching is that the ac- 
tivity itself was part of the traditional subsistence routine of the rural 
population, an activity embedded in customary rights. Poaching as a 
crime, therefore, entails less a change of behavior than a shift in the law of 
property relations. It is the state and its law which suddenly transforms 
these subsistence routines into everyday forms of resistance. The process 
has, of course, been repeated for most colonial societies in which the state 
redefined the forest as government property and then imposed a whole 
series of regulations and officials to enforce them. It was unlikely that the 
surrounding population would accept the logic by which unimproved, 
natural environments and their resources might suddenly be declared 
state property and willingly relinquish their traditional practices. Michel 
Foucault has, in the context of post-Revolutionary French history called at- 
tention to such state-created "crime." 
It was against the new regime of landed property - set up by a 
bourgeoisie that profited from the Revolution -that a whole 
peasant illegality developed . . . ; it was against the new system of 
the legal exploitation of labour that workers' illegalities developed; 
from the most violent such as machine breaking . . . to the most 
everyday such as absenteeism, abandoning work, vagabondage, 
pilfering raw materials . . . 
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In a comprehensive history of everyday forms of resistance, the section 
on poaching would no doubt be substantial. The nature of the forest (in 
other cases wastelands, commons, etc.) as a resource subject to competing 
claims is part of the explanation. Compare, for example, the relative ease 
of spiriting away firewood from a vast forest to the pilfering of grain from 
a well-guarded central granary. Any resource or good so geographically 
dispersed poses nearly insurmountable problems of enforcement. Forest 
guards, gamekeepers, are unlikely to make much of a dent on poaching 
when the possible sites of poaching and the potential poachers are legion. 
This means, in turn, that when a forest guard or gamekeeper does encoun- 
ter a poacher, he is likely to be outnumbered. As E.P. Thompson describes 
it, the threats, beatings, torchings of cottages, and occasional murders of 
gamekeepers frequently intimidated them into inactivity. 
The problems of enforcement, however, are not entirely attributable to 
geography and demography; they are due at least as much to tacit complic- 
ity, and, occasionally active cooperation among the population from 
which the poachers come. Consider the difficulties that poachers would 
face if local residents were actively hostile to them and willing to give evi- 
dence in court. Poaching as a systematic pattern of reappropriation is sim- 
ply unimaginable without a normative consensus that encourages it or, at 
a minimum, tolerates it. Otherwise it would be a simple matter to appre- 
hend offenders. The forms such coordination and cooperation might take 
are extremely difficult to bring to light. As Thompson notes, 
There might, indeed, have been something in the nature of 
a direct tradition, stretching across centuries, of secret poaching 
fraternities or associations in forest areas.5 
What is significant is that such coordination can typically be achieved 
through informal, rural social networks and that, when an "association" is 
formed its adherents have every reason - and often the means - to conceal 
its existence from the authorities and the historians. 
Peasant Tax Resistance 
If everyday resistance via poaching is the attempt to assert traditional 
cIaims to resources in the face of new property relations, tax resistance is 
a more defensive effort to defeat or minimize a direct appropriation. The 
successful resistance of the Malaysian peasantry to the state-collected Is- 
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lamic tithe (zakat) can provide a closer look at the importance of normative 
complicity, deception, the nature of the state, and the importance of long- 
run analysis.' 
The Islamic tithe itself, like its Christian and Judaic predecessors, is a tax 
of one tenth of the gross harvest, collected in kind, intended to promote Is- 
lamic charity and education. Until 1960 tithe contributions were entirely 
local and voluntary; since then the provincial authorities have centralized 
its administration and mandated the registration of acreage and yields in 
order to enforce its collection. Opposition to the new tithe was so unani- 
mous and vehement in the villages where I conducted research that it was 
a comparatively simple matter to learn about the techniques of evasion. 
They take essentially four forms. Some cultivators, particularly small- 
holders and tenants, simply refuse to register their cultivated acreage with 
the tithe agent. Others underreport their acreage andlor crop and may 
take the bolder step of delivering less rice than even their false declarations 
would require. Finally, the grain handed over is of the very poorest quality 
-it may be spoiled by moisture, have sprouted, be mixed with straw and 
stones so that the recoverable milled grain is far less than its nominal 
weight would suggest. 
The unannounced achievements of this resistance have been impres- 
sive. A local, but probably representative sample, revealed that the grain 
actually delivered to the state averaged less than one-fifth of the ten per- 
cent mandated by the law. Most notable, however, is the public silence 
maintained by the protaganists in this struggle. There have been no tithe 
riots, no tithe demonstrations, no petitions, no violent confrontations, no 
protests of any kind. Why protest, indeed, when quieter stratagems have 
achieved the same results at minimal risk? Unless one compared actual 
yields with tithe receipts, the resistance itself would remain publicly invisi- 
ble, for it is the safer course for resisters to leave the tithe system standing 
in name while they dismantle it in practice. This activity may not qualify 
as a form of collective action or a social movement but it has nevertheless 
achieved comparable results without affording the state an easily discer- 
nable target. There is no organization to be banned, no conspiratorial 
leaders to round up or buy off, no rioters to haul before the courts - only 
the generalized non-compliance by thousands of peasants. 
The tacit coordination that abets this resistance depends on a palpable 
"climate of opinion," a shared knowledge of the available techniques of 
evasion, and economic interest. A purely economic interest account of such 
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resistance, however, is inadequate. For one thing, the peasantry has a host 
of principled reasons for evading the tithe. There are gross inequities in its 
assessment (cultivators of crops other than rice, non-cultivating landlords, 
businessmen, officials, and wealthy Chinese all escape the tithe), its col- 
lection (irregularities in weighing and crediting), and above all, in its distri- 
bution (not a single sack of grain has ever come back to the village for poor 
relief). A skeptic might regard such arguments as rationalizations design- 
ed to put a principled facade on crass calculations of advantage. If this were 
the case it would be hard to explain why most villagers still voluntarily give 
"private" tithe gifts to poor relatives, neighbors, religious teachers, and 
harvest laborers. In other words, there is convincing evidence that it is not 
so much parting with the grain alone that is resented so much as the unjust 
manner in which it is appropriated. The same consensus about fairness 
that sustains resistance to the official tithe simultaneously impels most 
peasants to make tithe gifts within the village and extended family. 
The success of tithe resistance, or any resistance for that matter, is contin- 
gent on relationships of power. In this context, there is little doubt that the 
authorities could extract more of the tithe if they were determined to 
prosecute thousands of cases, raise the penalties for non-compliance, and 
appoint more enforcement personnel. It might not be cost-effective as a 
revenue measure, but it could be done. It is, however, not done because 
the ruling party faces electoral competition for the Muslimvote and the po- 
litical costs of alienating many of their rural electoral allies would, it 
judges, be prohibitive. TWO aspects of the dilemma faced by the govern- 
ment are worth emphasizing. First, the effective resistance of the official 
tithe was initially made possible by the peasantry's tacit use of its political 
weight, in the knowledge that the government would hesitate before 
proceeding against them. It is for similar reasons that peasants avoid taxes 
and default on agricultural loans under regimes which depend on their ac- 
tive support in one fashion or another. The second, and ironic, aspect of 
the resistance is that once it has become a customary practice it generates 
its own expectations about what is permissible. Once this happens it raises 
the political and administrative costs for any regime that subsequently de- 
cides it will enforce the rules in earnest. For everyday resisters there is 
safety in numbers and successfuI resistance builds its own momentum. 
Resistance of the kind described here may be pursued for centuries over 
a terrain of power that favors now the authorities and now the peasantry. 
Thus, for example, peasant resistance in France to the Catholic tithe, 
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abolished only after the revolution, provides an account of varying tech- 
niques of resistance over more than three ~enturies.~ Those who have exa- 
mined this record have been struck by the techniques, persistence, and 
long-run success of resistance. Although there were indeed occasionally 
tithe strikes, riots, and petitions, it is clear that the less visible forms of eva- 
sion were of greatest significance in reducing the actual tithe collection to 
manageable proportions. LeRoy Ladurie and Gay, surveying the evi- 
dence, advise historians to "study the ingenuity of peasants faced with 
disaster and explain why for centuries the tithe remained at a level which 
was just t~lerable."~ 
Marc Bloch has taken the case for the significance of everyday forms of 
resistance and expanded it to the history of agrarian class relations gener- 
ally. Bloch would direct our attention away from the rebellions which hold 
pride of place in the archival record and toward the non-spectacular forms 
of class struggle. As he wrote: 
Almost invariably doomed to defeat and eventual massacre, the 
great insurrections were altogether too disorganized to achieve any 
lasting result. The patient, silent struggles stubbornly carried out 
by rural communities over the years would accomplish more than 
these flashes in the pan.9 
Desertion 
Accounts of poaching and tithe evasion inevitably suggest that everyday 
forms of resistance are a matter of nibbling, of minute advantages and op- 
portunities which can have little effect on overall relationships of power. 
Acts which, taken individually may appear trivial, however, may not have 
trivial consequences when considered cumulatively, From a state-centric, 
historical view, many regime crises may be precipitated by the cumulative 
impact of everyday forms of resistance that reach critical thresholds. This 
is perhaps most strikingly evident in the case of desertion from armies. 
As Armstead Robinson has carefully documented, everyday forms of 
resistance played a key role in the collapse of the Confederacy during the 
U.S. Civil War.'' Incensed by laws which exempted many sons of plania- 
tion owners from conscription, impelled to save their families from the 
subsistence crisis of 1862, and, in any case, having little stake in defending 
slavery, the poor, hill country white yeomanry deserted the Confederate 
Army in great numbers. Robinson estimates that as many as 250.000 
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deserted or avoided col~scription altogether - a figure that is five times 
higher than the number of whites from the Confederate States who actu- 
ally served in the Union Armies. Their refusal to participate in what they 
termed "a rich man's war and a poor man's fight" was decisive in Lee's 
defeat at Antietam and in eastern Tennessee. As a southern clergyman 
noted, "our army has melted like a snow wreath, and chiefly by deser- 
tion."ll Defections from the ranks were compounded by massive shirk- 
ing, insubordination, and flight among the slave population which 
deprived the Confederacy of the food supplies and revenues it needed to 
prosecute the war successfully. Neither the defections nor the shirking 
and flight could have been sustained unless there had been a consensus 
that sustained it and prevented the authorities from bringing it to a halt. 
These "mutinous" activities were not part of a rebellion; they were not or- 
ganized or coordinated by anyone -and yet their aggregate impact was 
deadly, if not more so, than any large open movement of sedition might 
have been. 
Comparable cases abound. How is it possible, for example, to explain 
the collapse of the Czarist army and the subsequent victory of the Bolshe- 
viks without giving due weight to the massive desertions from the front in 
the summer of 1917 and the accompanying - unorganized - land seizures 
in the countryside? Few, if any, of the rank-and-file participants intended 
a revolution, but that is precisely what they helped precipitate.'' R.C. 
Cobb's account of draft resistance and desertion in both post-revolutionary 
France and under the early Empire are, in the same vein, compelling evi- 
dence for the role of everyday resistance in bringing down regimes.13 
Quite apart from military desertion, the social historian could profitably 
examine the role of petty tax resistance in producing, over time, the "fiscal 
crisis of the state" which frequently presages radical political change. Here 
too, without intending it, the small self-serving acts of thousands of petty 
producers may deprive a regime of the wherewithal to maintain its ruling 
coalition and prevail against its enemies. Short of revolution, there is little 
doubt that massive peasant non-compliance has often been responsible 
for major shifts in agrarian policy in the Third World. 
Agrarian Resistance to State Socialism. 
The property relations prevailing in a society closely determine the politi- 
cal shape the struggle over appropriation will take. In a liberal regime of 
private property in land, the struggle will typically pit the direct produ- 
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cers, whether smallholders, laborers, or tenants, against the owners of the 
other factors of production (landowners, moneylenders, banks, etc.). Con- 
flict with the state, when it occurs, is likely to focus on its fiscal and mone- 
tary policy or, at more radical moments, on the distribution of property in 
land. Under state socialism, by contrast, all the vital decisions about com- 
modity prices, the prices of agricultural inputs, credit, cropping patterns, 
and - under collectivization - the working day and the wage, are direct 
matters of state policy. Conflicts that might have been seen as private-sec- 
tor matters, with the state not directly implicated, become, under state so- 
cialism, direct clashes with the state. The peasant meets the state as em- 
ployer, buyer, supplier, moneylender, foreman, paymaster, and tax col- 
lector. 
Given the state-centric orientation of political studies, it is hardly sur- 
prising that everyday forms of resistance should seem so rife under such 
regimes. Part of this is simply an optical illusion created by the state having 
assumed the role of direct owner of the means of production and direct ap- 
propriator. Part is not illusion at all. Though it may occasionally improve 
his welfare, the aim of state socialism is invariably to reduce the autonomy 
of a stratum previously classifiable as petite bourgeoisie. The loss of auto- 
nomy by itself has been a source of ferocious resistance. State farms and 
collectives often break the direct link between production and consump- 
tion typical of petty bourgeois producers and this in turn creates a new ter- 
rain of resistance. For the small peasant, a reduction of labor in production 
is likely to be reflected on the dinner table whereas, for the laborer of the 
state farm, a withdrawal of labor effort is not neccesarily reflected directly 
in consumption. Finally, a major reason why everyday forms of resistance 
are so common in state-socialist forms of agriculture is because such sys- 
tems allow little else in the way of opposition. Controlling directly the 
means of coercion, the state typically forecloses open protest, except in ut- 
ter desperation, and the formal bodies that purport to represent the in- 
terests of agriculturists are, as often as not, transmission belts for instruc- 
tions from the authorities.14 
Over the long run, and frequently at tragic costs to themselves, everyday 
forms of resistance can provoke a fiscal crisis that leads to a change in 
policy. The massive economic reforms implemented beginning in 1978 and 
associated with the rise to power of Deng Xiaoping are a case in point. 
From one perspective, the dismantling of the collectives, the inauguration 
of the "family responsibility system: the encouragement of petty trade 
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and markets, may be viewed as a rational centrally-made decision to en- 
courage growth by far-reaching reforms. While such a view is not precisely 
wrong, it entirely misses the fact that everyday forms of peasant resistance 
over nearly two decades were instrumental in forcing this massive policy 
change.'' Following the policy-induced famine of the Great Leap Forward 
which claimed between 10 and 20 million lives by current estimates, it ap- 
pears that the desperate peasantry, assisted often by local cadres, redou- 
bled its resistance against fearful odds. A host of strategies emerged which 
included the underreporting of land, misreporting of cropping patterns 
and yields, making exaggerated claims about thefts and spoilage of grain, 
illegal procurements, hoarding of grain for local welfare funds and so on. 
In addition, since one's working day belonged to the collective and since 
this work was heavily taxed (through pricing and delivery regulations), 
the re-appropriation of time from the collective for private economic activi- 
ties became a significant means of resistance and survival. The goal of 
most of these stratagems was to minimize the grain which the local brigade 
or commune would have to hand over to higher authorities. Underreport- 
ing and other techniques were frequently encouraged by local team 
leaders and cadres who had learned the bitter lessons of compliance with 
planned targets. 
If he [the team leader] reported too honestly on our income to the 
brigade, then the orders that would come down each year would 
be for us to turn over more to the brigade. And that would mean 
less income for the team members. So the team leader would just 
tell them what he had to; he wouldn't let them know the real si- 
tuation.16 
The aim of China's peasantry in denying grain to the authorities was 
subsistence and survival. When all these petty acts were aggregated, 
however, their consequence was, by 1978, a procurement stalemate be- 
tween the state and rural producers. Population growth and sluggish 
yields owing to low procurement prices meant that per capita consump- 
tion was steady or declining. Unless production was reorganized, the state 
could only invest more in industry and administration by risking serious 
disorders. Local and occasionaily provincial authorities were tacitly en- 
couraging the resistance both to revive local production and to protect 
local consumption needs. 
Many of the "reforms" instituted in 1978 were nothing more than the ex- 
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post facto legalization of practices that peasants and local cadres had been 
quietly pursuing. Although their objectives were seldom more than 
"working the system to their minimum disadvantage" their persistence 
contributed greatly to an abrupt reversal of economic policy, the historical 
significance of which is still being played out.17 
Such tacit conspiracies of a good part of the countryside against the en- 
croaching socialist state are by no means confined to China. Thus when 
Hungarian peasants defended their interests in the late 1940s and early 
1950s against subsistence-threatening crop deliveries to the state, they 
avoided any direct confrontations.18 Although they farmed their own 
smallholdings (or in cooperatives that were formally independent) the 
system of forced deliveries imposed a de facto serfdom upon them, deter- 
mining what they might plant, how much they had to deliver, and the 
price they would receive. One stratagem that might lessen their burden 
was the underreporting of cultivated acreage. Whenever land came under 
a new jurisdiction (e.g. inheritance, transfer to cooperatives, confiscation 
from "kulaks") a fraction of the land mysteriously disappeared; by 1954 it 
was estimated that 1.3 million acres of arable - equivalent to the cultivated 
surface of one of the nation's largest counties - had evaporated in this 
fashion.19 It was impossible to recover. Black markets for production con- 
cealed from the state grew apace. Birth certificates were forged so that 
more of the local population was above age 65 and thus eligible for quota 
reductions. Local authorities abetted these evasions since any reduction in 
the local quota made it that much easier for them to fulfill the plan targets. 
Livestock was, administratively speaking, spirited away as well. 
The kulaks transferred their animals to the small peasants, small 
peasants to their relative in the cities. They had special techniques 
for hiding sheep in the well, for slaughtering pigs at night by the 
light of a floating wick, for milking the cows secretly, for keeping 
chickens and even pigs under the bed.20 
The net result of these defensive strategies from below was declining 
procurements. By 1954, the least successful procurement year/ there ap- 
peared no way to extract more from an increasingly bold and recalcitrant 
peasantry. As Rev notes, it may not quite be correct to say that the peasan- 
try overthrew the government in 1956 but it is reasonable to claim that the 
liberalization after 1954 came about primarily as a result of peasant resi- 
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stance. The subsequent economic and social reforms enacted in Hungary 
and, for that matter in Central Europe generally, he claims, are little more 
than the legalization of the practices of resistance given a new policy guise 
by professional reformers." The parallels with China are striking. This 
achievement, once again, was not won by open political opposition but 
rather through the aggregated acts of millions of agriculturalists. Although 
there was no secret conspiracy among them, they knew they were not 
alone. Like other Central European peasantries, they shared a tradition of 
centuries of resistance and they knew that a generalized resistance reduces 
the risk to which every single resister is exposed. Even so, the cost was not 
negligible; by 1953 the proportion of peasants who had been imprisoned 
and sent to internment camps exceeded 20 percent of the total village 
pop~lation.~'  
There is no assurance, however, that everyday forms of resistance and 
the procurement crises they can provoke will lead to concessions by the 
state. Nowhere is this so apparent as in the history of the Soviet Union. In 
1921, the peasantry had fought the Leninist state to a bitter and costly 
standstill which was followed by the liberalization of the NEP period. By 
1929-30 cultivators had, by hiding, privately selling (e.g. grain requisi- 
tioned for delivery) or destroying their produce and livestock, brought the 
Stalinist state to a similar procurement impasse. They themselves were on 
the brink of starvation. This time the response was Stalin's decision to fully 
collectivize. The deport~itions, executions, and famine which followed 
cost, at a conservative estimate, ten million lives.23 When the prize-win- 
ning author Sholokhov wrote reporting impending famine and complain- 
ing about the brutalities of collectivization, Stalin replied caustically about 
the forms of "quiet" resistance practiced by the peasantry. 
nd the other side is that the esteemed grain growers of your dis- 
trict (and not only of your district alone) carried on an "Italian 
strike" (sabotage!) and were not loath to leave the workers and the 
Red Army without bread. That the sabotage was quiet and out- 
wardly harmless (without bloodshed) does not change the fact 
that the esteemed grain growers waged what was virtually a 
"quiet" war against Soviet power. A war of starvation, dear Com- 
rade Shol~kov. '~ 
By using the full might of the Soviet state, by sending urban party cadres 
to supervise collectivization (many being replaced when they champi- 
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oned peasant interests), executing or deporting to labor camps those who 
resisted collectivization, and seizing grain regardless of the consequences 
for local subsistence, the authorities prevailed. The results for production 
were ruinous but the Soviet state now controlled more of that production 
as well as the life of the producers. Although public use of the term "fa- 
mine" was strictly forbidden in this period, one candid official made it 
clear what kind of war was being fought. 
A ruthless struggle is going on between the peasantry and our re- 
gime. It's a struggle to the death. This year was a test of our strength 
and their endurance. It took a famine to show them who is master 
here. It has cost millions of lives but the collective farm system is 
here to stay. We'we won the war.25 
This official declaration of victory serves to emphasize that direct con- 
frontations of power nearly always favor the state whose coercive power 
can be more easily mobilized and focused. A far longer historical view of 
this war of attrition in state appropriation might, however, yield a less 
straightforward assessment. Contemporary collective farm workers, react- 
ing to near subsistence wages in the state sector, respond by shirking, by 
the concealing of production, by sideline activities - often using state 
property - by diverting labor to their personal plot. Once again, the 
producers pay a high cost for this resistance. They work a second work-day 
on their private plots for a marginal return that is nearly zero and which is 
"a colossal exploiter of children, the aged, and the invalid."26 To an out- 
side observer it appears that a petty bourgeoisie is attempting to reconsti- 
tute itself, but in such cramped conditions that the results look like the 
self-exploitaiion described by the Hammonds for English weavers or by 
Chayanov for Russian artisanlflax-growing peasants of an earlier date. The 
effects of this resistance reach Gorbachev in the form of aggregate produc- 
tion statistics from a perenially weak state farm sector. It could not occur, 
however, without the tacit or active complicity of petty officials all the way 
down to clerks, drivers, agronomists, foremen, and technicians who sel- 
dom resist the temptation to treat their small corner of state power as pri- 
vate property. Non-cooperation by the producers is something of a daily 
plebescite on the confiscation of their labor in the state sector but it cannot, 
by itself, force a reorganization of agriculture along less exploitive lines. 
What the producers can do, though, is to determine what will not 
elicit their active cooperation and productive effort. 
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Evading the Written Record 
The perspective urged here suggests that the historiography of class strug- 
gle has been enormously distorted in a state-centric direction. The events 
that claim attention are the events to which the state, the ruling classes, 
and the intelligentsia accord most attention. Thus, for example, a small 
and futile rebellion claims attention all out of proportion to its impact on 
class relations while unheralded acts of flight, sabotage, theft which may 
have far greater impact are rarely noticed. The small rebellion, the doomed 
slave uprising, may have a symbolic importance for its violence and its 
revolutionary aims, but for most subordinate classes historically such rare 
episodes were of less moment than the quiet unremitting guerilla warfare 
that took place day-in and day-out. 
Everyday forms of resistance rarely make headlines. But just as millions 
of anthozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef, thousands upon thou- 
sands of petty acts of insubordination and evasion create a political and 
economic barrier reef of their own. And whenever, to pursue the simile, 
the ship of state runs aground on such a reef, attention is typically directed 
to the shipwreck itself and not the vast aggregation of actions which make 
it possible.27 It is very rare that the perpetrators of these petty acts seek to 
call attention to themselves. Their safety lies in their anonymity. Peasants 
succeed in their small stratagems to the extent that they do not appear in 
the archives. This is not to say that their resistance leaves no traces; it is 
rather that the traces must be teased out of the record by the historian who 
knows what he or she is looking for. Changes in the volume sf grain deliv- 
eries from certain districts, mysterious declines in livestock holdings, 
failures to realize conscription quotas, demographic shifts that may indi- 
cate flight, complaints by authorities and landowners about an increase in 
shirking andlor pilfering may point to a key area of political activity in 
which vital territory is being gained or lost by antagonistic classes. Even 
here the evidence is most likely to signal significant changes in the level of 
resistance, not the slower, grinding, background resistance which is likely 
to go unnoticed. 
It is also comparatively rare that officials of the state wish to publicize the 
insubordination behind everyday resistance. To do so would be to admit 
that their policy is unpopular and, above all, to expose the tennousness of 
their authority in the countryside - neither of which most sovereign states 
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find in their interest. The nature of the acts themselves and the self-in- 
terested muteness of the antagonists thus conspire to create a kind of com- 
plicitous silence which may all but expunge everyday forms of resistance 
from the official record. 
This anonymity contributed to an earlier view of the peasantry as a class 
that vacillated between abject passivity and brief, violent, and futile explo- 
sions of rage. It is, of course, true that the "on-stage" behaviour of peasants 
during periods of quiescence yields a picture of submission, fear, and cau- 
tion. By contrast peasant insurrections seem like visceral reactions of blind 
fury. What is missing from the account of "normal" passivity is the slow, 
silent struggle over crops, rents, labor, and taxes in which submission and 
stupidity are often no more than a pose - a necessary tactic. The public 
record of compliance and deference is often only half of the double life that 
W.E.B. DuBois understood all subordinate groups were obliged to lead. 
Such a double life with double thoughts, double duties . . . must 
give rise to double works and double ideals, and tempt the mind 
to pretense or revolt, to hypocrisy or radica l i~m.~~ 
The flexplosions" of open conflict which typically dominate the official 
record are frequently a sign that normal and largely covert forms of class 
struggle are failing - or, alternatively, have succeeded so well as to have 
produced a political crisis. Such declarations of open war, with their mor- 
tal risks, generally come only after a protracted struggle on different ter- 
rain. 
What Counts as Resistance 
It can and has been objected that the activities grouped under the term 
everyday resistance hardly merit attention. From this point of view they 
represent trivial coping mechanisms that are either non-political forms of 
self-help or, at best, prepolitical. I take this to be basically the position of 
Eric Hobsbawm, Eugene Genovese and others.2g 
The case against moving everyday forms of resistance closer to the center 
of the analysis of class relations rests on the claim that these activities are 
marginal because they are 1) unorganized, unsystematic and individual; 
2) opportunistic and self-indulgent; 3) have no revolutionary conse- 
quences andlor 4) imply in their intention or logic an accommodation with 
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the structure of domination. An argument along these lines necessarily 
implies that "real resistance" is organized, principled, and has revolution- 
ary implications. 
The question of opportunism and self-indulgence was treated earlier. It 
is sufficient to recall that if class domination is a process of systematic ap- 
propriation, then the measures devised to thwart that appropriation con- 
stitute a form of resistance. All class struggle must necessarily join self-in- 
terested material needs with conflict. 
Turning to the consequences and intentions of everyday forms of 
resistance, it is certainly true that the "resisters" rarely intend to make a 
revolution and their actions do not openly challenge existing power ar- 
rangements. It can also be demonstrated convincingly, however, that the 
motives of peasants and even proletarians who are part of revolutionary 
movements are rarely, if ever, aiming at revolutionary  objective^.^' 
Revolutionary action, in other words, is typically undertaken by rank- 
and-file actors who do not have revolutionary aims. Beyond this, however, 
actions such as pilfering, desertion, poaching, and foot-dragging do im- 
ply, by the very fact that they avoid open confrontations, a certain accom- 
modation with existing power relations. This position has some merit. It is 
rather like the claim that the poacher, by his secretiveness, recognizes the 
norm of law-and-order. The poacher in his case might be contrasted with, 
say, a revolutionary appropriation in which property is openly seized in 
the name of justice. To dismiss poaching with this argument, however, is 
to overlook entirely the vital role of power relations in constraining forms 
of resistance open to subordinate groups. The mortal risks involved in an 
open confrontation may virtually preclude many forms of resistance. If 
only open, declared forms of struggle are called "resistance; then all that 
is being measured may be the level of repression that structures the availa- 
ble options. More than one peasantry has been brutally reduced from 
open, organized, radical activity at one moment to sporadic acts of petty 
resistance at the next. What has changed in such cases is typically not the 
aims of the peasantry but the effectiveness of domination. 
There is, however, an additional problem deriving from a restricted con- 
ception of what constitutes organized activity. While much of everyday 
resistance is comprised of individual actions, this is not to say that these ac- 
tions lack coordination. A concept of cooperative activity, derived largely 
from formal, bureaucratic settings is of little assistance in understanding 
actions in small communities with dense informal social networks and 
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rich,historically deep, subcultures of resistance to outside claims. It is, for 
example, no exaggeration to assert that much of the folk culture of the 
peasant "little tradition" amounts to a legitimation, or even a celebration, 
of precisely the kinds of evasive forms of resistance described earlier. In 
this and other ways (e.g. tales of bandits, tricksters, peasant heroes, reli- 
gious myths, carnivalesque parodies of authorities) the peasant subcul- 
ture helps to underwrite dissimulation, poaching, theft, tax evasion, eva- 
sion of conscription and so on. While folk culture is not coordinational in 
any formal sense, it often achieves a "climate of opinion" which, in other 
more institutionalized societies, might require a public relations cam- 
paign. One of the striking things about peasant society is the extent to 
which a whole range of complex activities fromlabor-exchange to wedding 
preparations, to rituals are coordinated by networks of understanding and 
practice. It is the same with boycotts, with techniques for evading taxes 
and forced crop delivieries, with the conspiracy of silence surrounding 
thefts from landlords. No formal organizations are created because none 
are required; and yet a form of coordination is achieved which alerts us 
that what is happening is by no means merely random individual action. 
Nor is it too much to suggest that the historical experience of the peasantry 
has favored such forms of social action because they are opaque to outside 
surveillance and controL31 
Everyday forms of resistance are, it should be clear, not a peasant mo- 
nopoly. Anyone who has analysed the measures taken by landowners in 
the face of an announced land reform to evade its application to their hold- 
ings by dispersing titles, bribing officials, changing cropping patterns will 
recognize the pattern. Here it is worth noticing that, as in the case of 
peasants, everyday resistance is being used against a party of greater for- 
mal power: in this case the state. Generally, then, such resistance is virtually 
always a stratagem deployed by a weaker party in thwarting the claims of an in- 
stitutional or class opponent who dominates the public exercise of power. 
Several objections could be made against so inclusive a definition. The 
term, it might be claimed, ought only to be applied to classes at the bottom 
of the social stratification. By itself, this objection carries little weight since 
such an analytical concept should, in principle, be applied to any be- 
haviour that meets its definitional criteria. Two more serious and related 
objections remain. The first is that classes higher in the social stratification 
typically have a variety of other political resources that allow them to in- 
fluence elites and officials. Thus the middle and upper classes in a liberal 
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democracy have a variety of channels, including political campaigns, lob- 
bying, and legal assistance by which they can influence power. For the 
peasantry and other subordinate groups, through much of history, every- 
day forms of resistance have been the only resort short of rebellion. A se- 
cond issue is the question of the intention behind the resistance. Implicitly, 
the definition presupposes a situation in which those who use everyday 
resistance find the claim or exaction they are resisting unjust and yet are in- 
timidated by the fear of retaliation from any open, public protest of that in- 
justice. It is this sense of injustice that is responsible for the tacit coopera- 
tion that develops among the resisters. Evidence of intention is, naturally, 
hard to come by when there are strong incentives to conceal one's inten- 
tions. But when it is a question of both a systematic, established pattern of 
resistance undergirded by a popular culture that encodes notions of justice 
and anger encouraging that resistance, and a relation of domination that 
seems to preclude most other strategies, then, it almost certainly satisfies 
the d e f i n i t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Subordination and Political Dissimulation 
The control of anger and aggression is, for quite obvious reasons, a promi- 
nent part of the socialization of those who grow up  in subordinate groups. 
Much of the ordinary politics of subordinate groups historically has been 
a politics of dissimulation in which both the symbols and practices of 
resistance have been veiled. In place of the open insult, the use of gossip, 
nicknames and character assassination; in place of direct physical assault, 
the use of sabotage, arson, and nocturnal threats by masked men (e.g. 
Captain Swing, the Rebecca Riots, Les Demoiselles); in place of labor defi- 
ance, shirking, slowdowns, and spoilage; in place of the tax riot or rebel- 
lion, evasion and concealment. 
All of these forms of political struggle can be conducted just beneath the 
surface of a public realm of deference, compliance, and loyalty. No public 
challenge is ventured; no field of direct confrontation is volunteered. To be 
sure, such forms of struggle are best suited to those realms of conflict 
where the problems of control and supervision by authorities are greatest. 
The state finds it far simpler to collect an excise tax on imported luxury ve- 
hicles coming to the major port than to patrol its borders against smuggling 
of grain or to collect an income tax from its peasantry. 
The advantages of everyday forms of resistance lie not merely in the 
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smaller probability of apprehension. Their advantage lies at least as much 
in the fact that they are generally creeping incremental strategies that can 
be finely tuned to the opposition they encounter and that, since they make 
no formal claims, offer a ready line-of-retreat through disavowal. Tenant 
farmers who are in arrears on their rents to a landlord are in a different po- 
sition from tenant farmers in arrears to the same extent who have declared 
also that they are not paying because the land is theirs by right. State 
authorities and dominant elites will naturally respond with greater 
alacrity and force to open defiance which seems to jeopardize their posi- 
tion. For this reason, subordinate groups have attempted, when possible, 
to assert their resistance on the safer terrain of undeclared appropriation. 
Their stratagems minimize the maximum loss. Squatters, for example, un- 
less they have political support, will typically move off private or state 
lands when faced with force, only to return quietly at a later date. What 
everyday resistance lacks in terms of gestures and structured claims, it 
compensates for by its capacity for relentless pressure and the safety and 
anonymity it typically provides its users. 
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of normal resistance - both sym- 
bolic and material - by subordinate groups is the pervasive use of disguise. 
The disguise is of two main types, with many intermediate possibilities. 
First and most common is the concealment or anonymity of the resister. 
The poacher, the pilferer, the deserter, the tax evader, hopes that he and 
his act will be undetected or passed over. Similarly, the propagators of 
rumor and gossip are, by definition, anonymous; there is no apparent 
producer but scores of eager retailers. The use of disguises is often not just 
metaphorical but literal. Peasant and early working class protest in Europe 
provides innumerable examples of collective action where the message 
was clear but the messengers disguised. In the Captain Swing ',distur- 
bances" in the 1830's it was common for farm laborers to come at night in 
disguise with torches and insist on the destruction of threshing machines. 
Everything about the protest was quite specific except for the personal (not 
the class) identity of the protesters. The tradition of lower classes wearing 
disguises in order to speak bitter truths to their superiors is, of course, 
firmly institutionalized in carnival and a variety of other rituals of folk cul- 
ture. 
By contrast, a great deal of symbolic resistance by peasants and other 
subordinate groups reverses this arrangement. Instead of a clear message 
delivered by a disguised messenger, an ambigous message is delivered 
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by clearly identified messengers. Many of the folktales of peasant and 
slave culture fall into this category. The enourmously popular trickster 
figures among such groups (e.g. Till Eulenspiegel, Brer Rabbit, the mouse- 
deer of Malaysian culture) are taken both as disguised forms of aggression 
and implicit strategic advice. Because they are veiled, however, they do not 
offer the authorities a clear-cut occasion for retaliation. Slave spirituals 
stressing Old Testament themes of liberation and justice or what have been 
called the "World Upside Down" broadsheets (e.g. woodcuts depicting a 
serf being led on horseback by his lord) might be seen in the same light. 
And it has always been common for peasants, when making threats 
against elites or authorities to deliver those threats in the form of euphe- 
misms. Thus, for example, arsonists threatening wealthy farmers or 
aristocratic landholders in the early eighteenth century France would use 
known formulas for their threats: "I will have you awakened by a red 
cock!," "I will light your pipe," "I will send a man dressed in red who will 
pull everything down."33 The meaning of the message was, of course, per- 
fectly transparent, but the use of euphemism offered an avenue of retreat. 
Many forms of resistance in dangerous circumstances are intended to be 
ambiguos, to have a double meaning, to be garbled so that they cannot be 
treated as a direct, open challenge and, hence, invite an equally direct, 
open retaliation. For this reason it would be instructive to devise a theory 
of political masking by subordinate groups. An analysis of the pattern of 
disguises and the forms of domination under which they occur could con- 
tribute to our understanding of what happens to "voice," in Albert Hirsch- 
man's meaning of that term, under domination. Open declarations of defi- 
ance are replaced by euphemisms, metaphors; clear speech by muttering 
and grumbling; open confrontation by concealed non-compliance or defi- 
ance. This brief exposition of everyday forms of resistance is hardly the 
place to develop a theory of political disguises but the table below is in- 
tended to suggest one possible line of inquiry. 
Form of Domination Forms of Disguised Resistance 
Material Domination Everyday Forms of Resistance 
(appropriation of grain, e.g. poaching, squatting, deserting, eva- 
taxes, labor, etc.). sion, foot-dragging. 
Direct Opposition by Disguised Resisters 
e.g. masked appropriations, carnival. 
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Denial of Status 
(humiliation, disprivilege, Hidden Transcript or Anger, Aggression, 
assaults on dignity) and a Discourse of Dignity 
e.g. rituals of aggression, tales of revenge, 
creation of autonomous social space for 
assertion of dignity. 
Ideological Domination Development of Dissideizt Subculture 
(justification by ruling e.g. millenial religion, slave "hush ar- 
groups for slavery, borsy folk religion, myth of social ban- 
serfdom, caste, privilege), ditry and class heroes. 
Gestures, Resistance, and Rebellion 
To understand better the context and function of everyday forms of 
resistance it may be helpful to contrast them to political gestures. The 
poacher, who hopes to escape notice, may further his aim by making a 
public show of deference and devotion to those on whose property claims 
he is secretly encroaching. A practical act of resistance is thus often accom- 
panied by a public discursive affirmation of the very arrangements being 
resisted - the better to undermine them in practice. When the act of every- 
day resistance is meant to be noticed - meant to send a signal - as in the case 
of arson or sabotage, then the resisters take special care to conceal them- 
selves, often behind a facade of public conformity. 
We may contrast this pattern with acts of resistance in which the empha- 
sis is reversed. If everyday resistance is "heavy" on the instrumental side 
and "light" on the symbolic confrontation side, then the contrasting acts 
would be "light" on the instrumental side and "heavy" on the symbolic 
side.34 A few examples may help sharpen the contrast. During the Span- 
ish Civil War anti-clerical supporters of the Republic invaded churches and 
cathedrals in order to disinter the remains of priests, bishops, cardinals, 
and nuns who were buried in the Their exhumed remains were 
then spilled onto the steps of the churches by the crowds to be publicly 
seen by the population - most particularly by the enemies of the republic. 
It would be hard to imagine a more powerful act of anti-clerical symbolism, 
amore extreme act of public desecration and contempt. To this day the epi- 
sode is remembered and invoked publicly by the Right in Spain as an ex- 
ample of left-wing barbarism. What is notable about the revolutionary 
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exhumations in Spain is that they approached the limit of pure symbolic 
action. No property was redistributed, no one was murdered,36 nor was 
the balance of military force altered in any apparent way. The objective was 
rather to publicly exhibit the outmost contempt for the Spanish church, its 
symbols, and its heroes. As a declaration of war, symbolically speaking, 
revolutionary exhumations belong at the opposite end of a continuum of 
forms of resistance from the low-profile poacher. 
A huge realm of political conflict belongs to the same genus of public, 
symbolic confrontations. The wearing of black armbands to commemorate 
a political martyr, hunger strikes, not to mention the cultural confronta- 
tions invited by various counter-culture groups are precisely intended as 
discursive negations of the existing symbolic order. As such, they fail un- 
less they gain attention. If everyday resistance represents disguised forms 
of struggle over appropriation, then revolutionary exhumations represent 
public, open forms of confrontation over the symbols of dominant dis- 
course. Both forms of action are integral to political conflict. 
Most "everyday resisters" are rather like opponents of a law who esti- 
mate that it is more convenient to evade it or bribe their way around it 
rather than to change it. In the case of the peasantry, of course, the state 
and its laws are typically inaccessible, arbitrary, and alien. The notion of 
collective public action to change the structure of, say, property law or civil 
rights, is confined largely to the literate middle class and the intelligentsia. 
Directing attention to the strategic reasons for the symbolic low profile of 
everyday resistance may cast some light on how changes in the forms of 
political action occur. First, it is undeniable that everyday resistance is less 
threatening to public domination precisely because it avoids an engage- 
ment at that level. If squatters invaded private or state lands publicly, and 
declared their right to use it as they saw fit, they would, in effect, be declar- 
ing that they were not squatters and, instead, directly challenging 
property arrangements. This is more menacing to political authority and 
it is exactly what the Diggers did during the English Revolution when the 
balance of power temporarily freed them to act openly. Everyday 
resistance, then, by not openly contesting the dominant norms of law, cus- 
tom, politeness, deference, loyalty and so on leaves the dominant in com- 
mand of the public stage. Inasmuch as every act of compliance with a nor- 
mative order discursively affirms that order, while every public act of 
repudiation (e.g. failure to stand during national anthems in the United 
States) represents a threat to that norm, everyday resistance leaves 
dominant syrnboiic structures intact.37 
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If, however, the perceived relationship of power shifts in favor of subor- 
dinate groups, everyday resistance may well become a direct and open po- 
litical challenge and surreptitious or disguised symbolic dissent may be- 
come a public renunciation of domination. Aesopian language may give 
way to direct vituperation and everyday forms of resistance to overt, collec- 
tive defiance. 
The prehistory of many large rebellions and revolutions might be 
retrospectively recast along these lines. A pattern of quiet resistance both 
symbolically and materially suddenly becomes generalized, massive and 
open as the political situation presents new possibilities that previously 
seemed utopian. The French peasantry who burned chateaux and abbeys 
in 1789 were presumably not perfectly allegiant retainers to their kings and 
lords in 1788. The shifts in power that make possible new forms of 
resistance may often originate outside the immediate domain we are con- 
sidering as in cases of world-wide trade slumps, defeat in war, and so on. 
They may also originate in the very process of resistance and counter- 
resistance. Balzac, though his disapproval is apparent, captures the 
process with respect to poaching and gleaning. 
Do not imagine that Tonsard, or his old mother or his wife and 
children ever said in so many words, "we steal for a living and do 
our stealing cleverly," These habits had grown slowly. The family 
began by mixing a few green boughs with the dead wood, then, 
emboldened by habit and by a calculated impugnity.. .after twenty 
years the family had gotten to the point of taking wood as if it 
were their own and making a living almost entirely by theft. The 
rights of pasturing their cows, the abuse of gleaning grain, of 
gleaning grapes, had gotten established little by little in this 
fashion. By the time the Tonsards and the other lazy peasants of 
the valley had tasted the benefits of these four rights acquired by 
the poor in the countryside, rights pushed to the point of pillage, 
one can imagine that they were unlikely to renounce them unless 
compelled by a force stronger than their audacity.38 
Balzac, it should be added, observes that many of these new "rights" were 
entrenched by peasants taking advantage of the Revolution and the politi- 
cal vacuum that followed it. 
Everyday forms of resistance may be thought of as exerting a constant 
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pressure, probing for weak points in the defenses of antagonists, and test- 
ing the limits of resistance. In the case of poaching, for example, there may 
be a fairly stable tension over time between poachers and gamekeepers. 
But when, say, it turns out that over the past few months the taking of rab- 
bits is much less frequently punished or prevented, the volume of poach- 
ing and the number of participants is likely to swell to a point where a cus- 
tom or even a right to take rabbits threatens to become e~ tab l i shed .~~  
Alternatively, any number of events might impel poachers to run more 
risks - e.g. a crop failure, an increase in meat prices, higher taxes - so that 
their boldness and numbers overwhelm the existing capacity of those who 
enforce game laws. There is strength in numbers, and poaching that be- 
comes generalized to whole communities may, as Balzac notes, require 
new levels of coercion to re-establish the old balance.40 The hydraulic 
metaphor implicit here of water of variable pressure, straining against a 
(moveable!) retaining well having certain strengths and weaknesses is 
necessarily crude but, perhaps, suggestive. 
Much the same approach might be applied to symbolic defiance. Slaves, 
serfs, tenant farmers and workers say in public pretty much what their 
masters, lords, landlords, and bosses expect them to say. Yet, there are 
likely to be hidden transcripts of what subordinates actually think that can 
be recovered in off-stage conversation in slave quarters, veiled cultural per- 
formances (e.g. folk-tales, carnival). These hidden transcripts may be pic- 
tured as continually testing the line of what is permissable on-stage. One 
particularly intrepid, risk-taking, angry, unguarded subordinate says 
something that just touches or crosses the line. If it is not rebuked or 
punished, others, profiting from the example, will venture across the line 
as well, and a new de facto line is created, governing what may be said or 
gestured. In revolutions, one is likely to see unbridled anger - the entire 
hidden transcript - spoken openly and acted openly. It is unlikely that we 
can account for the content of this action by reference to outside agitators, 
their ideology, or even the aspirations engendered by a revolutionary 
process. The revolutionary actions might well have been prefigured in 
their practices of resistance and in their off-stage discourse. What had 
changed was above all the conditions which had previously confined the 
public expression of these actions and sentiments. 
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